SHG Bank Linkage Model pioneered by NABARD served the dual purpose of financial inclusion as well as social empowerment for rural poor women from excluded communities. SHG program had shown to be successful in connecting both unserved as well as under-served customers with financial services.
In the changing financial landscapes, it's merely a question of time before the JLG movement overshadows the SHG movement. The data on regulated microfinance institutions (MFIs) that submitted their numbers to the Microfinance Institutions Network indicates that over the past year, loan portfolios grew by 84 percent and loan disbursements grew by 45 percent (Source). SHGs financed by the bank despite government schemes like NRLM became stagnant with the growth of the MFI sector. The data set (Source) shows a decline in SHG financed by banks post 2013 while the JLG movement is seeing tremendous growth.
JLG model has led to the establishment of a large microcredit sector in India post-2010. While SHG promoted by NGOs and government agencies are either small in numbers or with high default rates. The reason behind this can be explained through last-mile outreach, continuity in service, strategic approach of the movement, and market-led changes in the society.
Both SHGs and JLGs have distinct credit delivery models. The members are expected to visit the bank and make repayments on their own in the SHG model even when a visit to the bank branch leads to travel expenses and loss in daily wages for the client. SHGs have to manage the entire repayment collection process and maintaining records. This process is reversed in the JLG model practiced by MFIs with a door-to-door delivery solution of cash disbursement and repayment with proper records.
SHPIs (mostly NGOs) promote SHGs for deepening the impact of their programs and consolidating their own social agenda. Promoting agencies are solely dependent on the funding agencies and aid under any government schemes for the cost of formation. SHPIs typically have a mandate for capacity building through training, credit linkage of the SHGs to banks, and their monitoring role vis-a-vis the group discipline that is limited for the project duration. Hence, SHPIs were able to sustain regular and quality customer service to the women members during the project period only. Public sector and rural banks have been lending to SHGs only due to government-imposed, priority-sector lending quotas. Once the support from the SHPI ends, the bankers are a bit reluctant to provide financial support to SHGs due to fear of default. SHGs are also implementing vehicles for various welfare schemes in rural areas and get funds for it. But most SHGs are running on paper only. The validation and grading exercise to know the health of SHGs are avoided by both government machinery and NGOs as this can expose fraud at the ground level. This also led to decay in the quality and credibility of SHGs.
MFIs diversified the geography to cover for political risk post-Andhra crisis. The consolidation phase was achieved in the MFI market as the crisis has swept away small players and make investors cautious. But the value of acquiring customers went up due to the introduction of credit bureaus. The strategy adopted by MFI for acquiring new clients was based on low risk and high pace growth. They concentrated on the regions where the SHG program was implemented on a large scale with successful results. The new borrowers came by the restructuring of already existing JLG and SHG members. The incentives of a loan officer in MFI are based on loan disbursements and recoveries. As a result, they could form JLGs and disburse bigger ticket size loans if they include SHG members with inculcated good credit history in the JLG formation. Also, women preferred the JLG model due to the availability of credit in increasing amounts without any mandatory savings.
SHGs are gradually becoming the aggregate of individual actions and rarely work as collective action. The members of SHGs are more inclined towards starting an individual-based activity rather than collective-based activities. This behavior shows either SHG members have not much awareness about the benefits of coming together or don't have cohesion among them. A major role behind the screen was played by the external market-led economy having dynamic individualism and consumerism as its underlying themes. There is tremendous heterogeneity even among the poor SHG members based on parameters of aspirations and entrepreneurism. The break with tradition and affirmative action of state meant the break with established identity-giving authority. The new individuals, freed from the traditional collective, have started to reorient themselves in a new manner. In the booming economy, there are chances of class mobility for entrepreneurial households through remittances and migration. The lines of class division are crossed now more frequently, the collective identities based on class or caste association are loosening up and leading to ineffective collective action. Hence, theories of collective action are not working as effective now in the rural ecosystem,
This concludes the brief summary of the emerging debate. The popularity of the JLG has eclipsed SHG but its current clients will be shifting to Small Finance Banks to avail savings, credit, and other full range of financial services. The affluent clients will drift towards JLG while the SHG movement will continue to reach out to vulnerable and marginalized people who own little or no land, are predominantly illiterate, and lack access to formal sources of financing.
In the changing financial landscapes, it's merely a question of time before the JLG movement overshadows the SHG movement. The data on regulated microfinance institutions (MFIs) that submitted their numbers to the Microfinance Institutions Network indicates that over the past year, loan portfolios grew by 84 percent and loan disbursements grew by 45 percent (Source). SHGs financed by the bank despite government schemes like NRLM became stagnant with the growth of the MFI sector. The data set (Source) shows a decline in SHG financed by banks post 2013 while the JLG movement is seeing tremendous growth.
JLG model has led to the establishment of a large microcredit sector in India post-2010. While SHG promoted by NGOs and government agencies are either small in numbers or with high default rates. The reason behind this can be explained through last-mile outreach, continuity in service, strategic approach of the movement, and market-led changes in the society.
Both SHGs and JLGs have distinct credit delivery models. The members are expected to visit the bank and make repayments on their own in the SHG model even when a visit to the bank branch leads to travel expenses and loss in daily wages for the client. SHGs have to manage the entire repayment collection process and maintaining records. This process is reversed in the JLG model practiced by MFIs with a door-to-door delivery solution of cash disbursement and repayment with proper records.
SHPIs (mostly NGOs) promote SHGs for deepening the impact of their programs and consolidating their own social agenda. Promoting agencies are solely dependent on the funding agencies and aid under any government schemes for the cost of formation. SHPIs typically have a mandate for capacity building through training, credit linkage of the SHGs to banks, and their monitoring role vis-a-vis the group discipline that is limited for the project duration. Hence, SHPIs were able to sustain regular and quality customer service to the women members during the project period only. Public sector and rural banks have been lending to SHGs only due to government-imposed, priority-sector lending quotas. Once the support from the SHPI ends, the bankers are a bit reluctant to provide financial support to SHGs due to fear of default. SHGs are also implementing vehicles for various welfare schemes in rural areas and get funds for it. But most SHGs are running on paper only. The validation and grading exercise to know the health of SHGs are avoided by both government machinery and NGOs as this can expose fraud at the ground level. This also led to decay in the quality and credibility of SHGs.
MFIs diversified the geography to cover for political risk post-Andhra crisis. The consolidation phase was achieved in the MFI market as the crisis has swept away small players and make investors cautious. But the value of acquiring customers went up due to the introduction of credit bureaus. The strategy adopted by MFI for acquiring new clients was based on low risk and high pace growth. They concentrated on the regions where the SHG program was implemented on a large scale with successful results. The new borrowers came by the restructuring of already existing JLG and SHG members. The incentives of a loan officer in MFI are based on loan disbursements and recoveries. As a result, they could form JLGs and disburse bigger ticket size loans if they include SHG members with inculcated good credit history in the JLG formation. Also, women preferred the JLG model due to the availability of credit in increasing amounts without any mandatory savings.
SHGs are gradually becoming the aggregate of individual actions and rarely work as collective action. The members of SHGs are more inclined towards starting an individual-based activity rather than collective-based activities. This behavior shows either SHG members have not much awareness about the benefits of coming together or don't have cohesion among them. A major role behind the screen was played by the external market-led economy having dynamic individualism and consumerism as its underlying themes. There is tremendous heterogeneity even among the poor SHG members based on parameters of aspirations and entrepreneurism. The break with tradition and affirmative action of state meant the break with established identity-giving authority. The new individuals, freed from the traditional collective, have started to reorient themselves in a new manner. In the booming economy, there are chances of class mobility for entrepreneurial households through remittances and migration. The lines of class division are crossed now more frequently, the collective identities based on class or caste association are loosening up and leading to ineffective collective action. Hence, theories of collective action are not working as effective now in the rural ecosystem,
This concludes the brief summary of the emerging debate. The popularity of the JLG has eclipsed SHG but its current clients will be shifting to Small Finance Banks to avail savings, credit, and other full range of financial services. The affluent clients will drift towards JLG while the SHG movement will continue to reach out to vulnerable and marginalized people who own little or no land, are predominantly illiterate, and lack access to formal sources of financing.
